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Part 2: Empirical Studies
Angus Maddison
Measuring Long Term Growth and Productivity Change
on a Macro-economic Level
This note is intended as a comment on Patrick O'Brien's proposal for a cooperative
research effort to measure Performance of the West European economies. It has
three parts:
a) it summarises the findings of a study I recentiy finished on long term changes in
per capita income and productivity in sixteen advanced capitalist countries;
b) it makes some suggestions pertinent to further research by economic historians in
this area in which I stress the virtues of trying to make rather aggregative macro-eco¬
nomic measures for periods usually considered too remote for such treatment;
c) the annex provides long term estimates of GDP in 16 countries with source notes,
as an illustration of the wealth of material already available for Performance meas¬
urement on the macroeconomic level.
Findings
In my own recent work1 I have attempted to analyse the changes in the rhythm of
growth in capitalist countries since 1820, dividing the past 160 years into four phases,
each with significantly different economic Performance as measured by macro-eco¬
nomic indicators. I also made a rough comparison of the macro-economic Perform¬
ance ofthe "capitalist" epoch as a whole, since 1820, with characteristic Performance
in three preceding epochs in Western Europe's economic history, i.e. an epoch of
"agrarianism" from 500 to 1500 AD during which there were fluctuations but little
net growth in population and income; an epoch of "expanding agrarianism" from
1500 io 1700 during which population rose by half and real income per head by
about a quarter; and an epoch of "merchant capitalism" from 1700 to 1820 when
both population growth and real income per capita increased twice as fast as from
1500 to 1700.
Performance in the four epochs and four phases is summarised in table 1. It can be
seen that in all the four phases of "capitalist" development, macro-economic Per¬
formance has been very much better than in any of the previous epochs.
1. Maddison, A., Phases of Capitalist Development, Oxford 1982 (also in French, in 1981, Les
Phases du Developpement Capitaliste, Paris).
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Table 1: Performance Characteristics of Epochs and Phases





















Source: This table and the following ones are all derived from A. Maddison, Phases
of Capitalist Development, Oxford University Press, 1982 (available in French in 1981
Les Phases du Developpement Capitaliste, Economica, Paris).
For the periods before 1820, the quantitative evidence on growth is, of course, quite
weak, and it may seem foolhardy to advance quantitative assessments at all in such a
Situation. Nevertheless, given the fact that there are important differences of opinion
on Performance in e.g. the 1500-1700 period, even rough quantitative specification
of likely amplitudes helps to sharpen critical analysis of the evidence, and points to
areas where the evidence can be improved by further research. For 1500-1700, op-
posing schools of thought on Western per capita Performance are represented by
Kuznets and Landes on the one hand, Le Roy Ladurie and Abel on the other.2 My
own tentative view of Performance in this period (as represented in table 1) is a com¬
promise between the Kuznets and Le Roy Ladurie positions, but it is clearly possible
to improve on evidence by further research directed to the Performance of nation
states. One weakness of the distinguished work of French quantitative historians for
this period is that it is nearly all regional or oecumenic rather than national in
scope.
For the 1700-1820 period, more elaborate analyses of growth are available and the
best evidence on output trends in Western Performance is for France, the Nether¬
lands, and the U.K. I have relied heavily on the work of Phyllis Deane for the U.K.
2. Kuznets, S., Population Capital and Growth, London 1974, pp. 139 and 167 suggests a growth
rate of 0.2 per cent a year for per capita income in Europe from 1500 to 1750. Landes, D.S.,
The Unbound Prometheus, Cambridge 1969, p. 14 suggests that from the year 1000 to the
eighteenth Century European real income per head may have tripled. Le Roy Ladurie, E., Les
Paysans de Languedoc, Paris 1966 suggests stagnant income from 1500 to 1700. Abel, W.,
Agrarkrisen und Agrarkonjunktur, Hamburg 1978, pp. 285-9 suggests a per capita decline in
this period.
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and Jan Marczewski for France.3 For the Netherlands, which was still the economic
leader for most of this periods, there is a good deal of evidence on economic Per¬
formance which has yet to be recast systematicaUy in national accounting terms.4
There is rather little early evidence on working hours, activity rates or unemploy¬
ment, so estimates of GDP per man hour are more shaky than those for GDP per
head of population. However, if one relies on the reasoning of Esther Boserup5 about
the likelihood of increased labour effort as a source of increase in agricultural output
in the early stages of accelerated growth, it seems quite unlikely that in the pre-capi¬
talist epochs labour productivity grew faster than output per capita. If anything it
was likely to have grown more slowly.
Within the "capitalist" period since 1820, my estimates of labour productivity gen¬
erally start only in 1870, but since then average working hours have fallen by roughly
half, from around 3,000 to 1,600 a year, so it is clear that labour productivity has in¬
creased faster in the "capitalist" epoch than per capita GDP—probably around 20
fold from 1820 to 1980 compared with a 13 fold increase in per capita GDP.
Table 2: Growth of Output (GDP at Constant Prices) per Head
of Population 1700-1979
annual average Compound growth rates
to
1700 1820 1870 1913 1950 1973 1820
1820 1870 1913 1950 1973 1979 1979
Australia n.a. 0.6 0.7 2.5 1.3 n.a.
Austria 0.7 1.5 0.2 5.0 3.1 1.5
Belgium 1.9 1.0 0.7 3.6 2.1 1.7
Canada n.a. 2.0 1.3 3.0 2.1 n.a.
Denmark 0.9 1.6 1.5 3.3 1.8 1.6
Finland n.a. 1.7 1.7 4.2 2.0 n.a.
France 0.3a 1.0 1.5 1.0 4.1 2.6 1.6
Germany 1.1 1.6 0.7 5.0 2.6 1.8
Italy n.a. 0.8 0.7 4.8 2.0 n.a.
Japan 0.0 1.5 0.5 8.4 3.0 1.8
Netherlands -0.1 1.5 0.9 1.1 3.5 1.7 1.5
Norway 1.0 1.3 2.1 3.1 3.9 1.8
Sweden 0.6 2.1 2.2 3.1 1.5 1.8
Switzerland 1.7 1.2 1.5 3.1 -0.2 1.6
U.K. 0.4 1.5 1.0 0.9 2.5 1.3 1.4
U.S.A. 1.4 2.0 1.6 2.2 1.9 1.8
Arithmetic Average 0.2 1.1 1.4 1.2 3.8 2.0 1.6
a) 1701/10-1820
3. See their work cited in the annex. 4. See the annex.
5. See Boserup, E., The Conditions of Agricultural Growth, London 1965, for a major contribu¬
tion to anti-Malthusian analysis of growth processes and productivity.
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Table 3: Growth of Output (GDP at Constant Prices) 1700-1979
annual average Compound growth rates
to
1700 1820 1870 1913 1950 1973 1820
1820 1870 1913 1950 1973 1979 1979
Australia n.a. 3.2 2.1 4.7 2.5 n.a.
Austria (1.4) 2.4 0.2 5.4 3.1 2.0
Belgium 2.7 2.0 1.0 4.1 2.3 2.3
Canada n.a. 3.8 2.9 5.2 3.2 n.a.
Denmark 1.9 2.7 2.5 4.0 2.1 2.6
Finland n.a. 3.0 2.4 4.9 2.3 n.a.
France 0.6a 1.4 1.7 1.0 5.1 3.0 2.0
Germany 2.0 2.8 1.3 6.0 2.4 2.6
Italy n.a. 1.5 1.4 5.5 2.6 n.a.
Japan (0.4) 2.5 1.8 9.7 4.1 2.7
Netherlands 0.1 2.4 2.1 2.4 4.8 2.4 2.7
Norway (2.2) 2.1 2.9 4.0 4.4 2.7
Sweden (1.6) 2.8 2.8 3.8 1.8 2.5
Switzerland (2.5) 2.1 2.0 4.5 -0.4 2.4
U.K. 1.1 2.4 1.9 1.3 3.0 1.3 2.0
U.S.A. 4.4 4.1 2.8 3.7 2.7 3.8
Arithmetic Average 0.6 2.1 2.5 1.9 4.9 2.5 2.5
a) 1701-10 to 1820. The figures are adjusted to exclude the impact of boundary
changes.
One of the objectives of my study was to examine the Schumpeterian literature on
the dynamics of capitalist development, but I reject Schumpeter's theories about reg¬
ulär long term rhythms and waves of innovation in favour of more ad hoc explana¬
tions of changes in momentum which in my view are due to factors such as wars,
changes in economic policy, and in the productivity gaps between the successive lead
countries (the U.K. and the U.S.A.) and the follower countries. I also argue that the
pace of technical progress has been much smoother than Schumpeter suggested.
Another conclusion I reach is that the Rostow-Gerschenkron thesis of staggered
take-offs into capitalist type growth in the nineteenth Century is in conflict with the
evidence we have, and that all the sixteen countries I examined (except Japan and
possibly Italy) probably maintained a significant growth rhythm from 1820 onwards.
This conclusion is based largely on the GDP and GDP per capita evidence in tables 2
and 3 but is also buttressed by the evidence on foreign trade growth.
My productivity estimates are in terms of labour, rather than total factor produc¬
tivity. Estimates of the latter are now feasible, because measures of growth in capital
stock are available for the seven biggest countries over rather long periods, using ex¬
isting national estimates, of which those of Feinstein for the U.K. have the longest
coverage. Apart from major theoretical problems in finding appropriate weights for
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total factor productivity indices, there are obvious pitfalls in their use in historical
analysis as revealed in McCIoskey's comparison ofthe British and U.S. iron and steel
industry which finds little difference in the Performance ofthe two countries in terms
of total factor productivity.6 This tends to conceal the fact that U.S. labour produc¬
tivity grew faster than that ofthe U.K. because its investment effort was bigger.
Table 4: GDP per Man Hour in 1970 U.S. Relative Prices ($)




1870 0.42 0.43 0.17 0.74 0.80 0.70
1890 0.58 0.62 0.24 0.97 1.06 1.06
1913 0.90 0.95 0.37 1.23 1.35 1.67
1929 1.31 1.19 0.64 1.82 1.70 2.45
1950 1.85 1.40 0.59 2.27 2.40 4.25
1960 2.87 2.72 1.03 3.17 2.99 5.41
1973 5.80 5.40 3.49 6.17 4.84 7.60
1979 7.11 6.93 4.39 7.48 5.48 8.28
Table 5: Gross Non-Residential Fixed Capital Stock per Person
Employed 1820-1978
(Dollars of 1970 U.S. purchasing power)
1820 1870 1890 1913 1950 1973 1978
Canada n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 16.279 29.760 33.553
France n.a. n.a. n.a. 6.481 10.346 23.653 28.800
Germany n.a. 3.597 5.311 7.888 9.386 26.733 34.877
Italy n.a. n.a. 2.059 3.150 6.151 16.813 20.178
Japan n.a. n.a. .713 1.178 2.873 14.172 20.103
U.K. 3.922 6.068 6.658 7.999 9.204 17.718 20.931
U.S.A. n.a. 5.066 6.838 13.147 18.485 30.243 32.001
Research Strategy in Measuring Productivity and Growth Trends
There is, of course, a huge literature on problems of growth analysis, and some of
6. See McCIoskey, D. N., Economic Maturity and Entrepreneurial Decline, British Iron and Steel
1870-1913, Harvard 1973.
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these e.g. index number problems, have been pretty exhaustively diagnosed. I confine
myself to four points which are relevant to the type of comparative research effort
which Patrick O'Brien has been advocating.
a) Use ofa National Accounts Framework
My first recommendation is to anchor analysis of growth trends in aggregates which
measure total economic activity. The economic significance of GDP or GNP as a
measure of economic Performance is clearer than that of partial measures such as ag¬
ricultural or industrial output, or indicators for individual commodities, which ear¬
lier growth analysts were forced to use. The fact that aggregate activity can be cros-
schecked in several dimensions e. g. as a sum of expenditures, of incomes, or of Out¬
put is also of major help. Estimates of these aggregates are now available for many
countries back into the nineteenth Century, and can be pushed back further. A con-
certed effort for a number of countries will throw up many hints of how data gaps
can be filled. It is now about twenty years since Kuznets and Abramovitz launched a
cooperative research effort of this type which led to production of Malinvaud's study
on France, Fua's on Italy, Ohkawa and Rosovsky on Japan, and the forthcoming
Matthews' study on the U.K.7 What I am suggesting is another round of this type but
pushed back to 1820.
There are, of course, problems in measuring output for the whole economy, but
this is true for partial measures too. The logic ofthe national accounts aggregates has
been explored in a highly sophisticated way over the past 40 years, and I think the lit¬
erature already provides negative answers to some ofthe arguments of O'Brien and
Keyder in favour of excluding Services from the aggregates to be studied.8
I am not suggesting that partial measures are not worth using in growth analysis,
but there has been a rather marked tendency in the past for users of partial measures
to claim that they can thereby discern movements in aggregate economic activity.
This temptation is much weaker if an articulate national accounting framework is
used.
b) Measure Levels as Well as Growth
A second point worth stressing in productivity or growth analysis is the great value of
benchmark estimates which make it possible to compare levels of Performance be¬
tween countries as well as their growth rates. Here O'Brien and Keyder are on the
right path in their U.K./French comparisons, but the whole business of international
comparisons has been greatly facüiated over the past thirty years by the work of
Irving Kravis.9 This work is another firm anchor for international comparisons
which should be exploited wherever possible in long run analysis of productivity
trends.
7. These studies are all cited in the annex, except Matthews, R. C. O., Feinstein, C, and Odling-
Smee, J., British Economic Growth, Stanford, forthcoming.
8. See O'Brien, P., and Keyder, C, Economic Growth in Britain and France 1780-1914, London,
1978, pp. 28-32.
9. See Kravis, I. B., Heston, A., and Summers, R., International Comparisons ofReal Product and
Purchasing Power, Baltimore and London 1978.
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c) Appropriate Periodicity
A third important problem in such studies is getting the most appropriate periodicity
for the analysis or comparison. Getting this right usually involves a good deal of iter¬
ative testing. But there are some traps to be avoided. One is to neglect the economic
history of war years. This has been the practice in several distinguished studies of
long term growth, e.g. Hoffmann's study on German growth. But if we compare
peacetime growth in Germany and another country with a totally different war ex¬
perience, judgements on the causes for differential peacetime Performance can be
heavily distorted. Another trap is to compare the growth Performance of one country
with that of another at a different period when they are alleged to have experienced
similar "stages of growth". This type of comparison must be handled very carefully
because the technological options of countries are different at different times, and
the lead country- follower country gap may also be very different.
d) Identifiable National Aggregates
Finally, I would stress that in spite of changes in boundaries, it is worth trying to
frame quantitative analysis of European progress over the past two centuries in terms
of national units. In the case of GDP or population it is probably possible to do this.
For individual sectors of the economy this is more difficult, and for foreign trade it
may be very difficult for periods when the customs boundaries were changed. These
problems are perhaps most important for Germany, and are not very satisfactorily
handled in Hoffmann's basic study. But the problem arises in several other countries
to an important degree, e.g. there is the problem of Ireland whose pace and level of
development was different from that in the rest of the U.K. economy in the nine¬
teenth Century. But this point is often neglected in international comparisons and
may lead to error.
Zusammenfassung:
Die Messung von langfristigem Wirtschaftswachstum und Produktivitäts¬
änderungen auf makroökonomischer Ebene
Mit diesem Beitrag soll ein Kommentar zu Patrick O'Briens Vorschlag geliefert wer¬
den, in einem kooperativen Forschungsvorhaben die wirtschaftliche Leistung westeu¬
ropäischer Länder zu messen. Die Arbeit gliedert sich in drei Teile:
a) zunächst werden die Ergebnisse meiner kürzlich fertiggestellten Studie über die
langfristigen Änderungen des Pro-Kopf-Einkommens und der Produktivität in
sechzehn fortgeschritten kapitalistischen Ländern zusammengefaßt;
b) sodann werden Wirtschaftshistorikern, die weitere Forschung auf diesem Gebiet
betreiben, einige Vorschläge gemacht. Vor allem wird dabei betont, wie sinnvoll
es ist, makroökonomische Messungen auf ziemlich hohem Aggregationsniveau
selbst für die Zeiträume durchzuführen, die wegen ihrer zeitlichen Distanz dieser
Methode nicht zugänglich sein sollen;
c) in einem Anhang sind langfristige Schätzungen des Bruttoinlandsproduktes
(Gross Domestic Product) von sechzehn Ländern aufgeführt. Die Quellenhin¬
weise dazu belegen, wie reichhaltig schon jetzt Material über die Messung wirt¬
schaftlicher Leistung auf makroökonomischer Ebene zur Verfügung steht.
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L2 (11.2) 12.56 13.8 2.03











































































a) Estimates adjusted as far as possible to exclude the impact of frontier changes. Fi¬
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Australia Austria Belgium Canada Denmark Finland France Germany
1907 80.0 91.4 89.2 70.4 82.9 82.6 85.5 82.5
1908 78.3 91.8 90.1 73.4 85.5 82.4 86.8 83.9
1909 82.1 91.5 91.8 81.7 88.8 83.0 88.2 85.6
1910 88.2 92.8 94.2 83.3 91.5 85.3 88.2 88.7
1911 91.3 95.7 96.4 90.5 96.4 88.7 92.1 91.7
1912 95.1 100.5 98.7 92.2 96.4 96.1 100.0 95.7




Italy Japan Netherlands Norway Sweden Switzerland U.K. U.S.A.
87.1 88.2 87.1 80,1 83.1 91.1 85.5
87.0 88.8 86.9 82.7 83.4 87.4 78.5
92.4 88.7 89.7 84.9 83.6 89.4 88.1
87.7 90.2 89.3 87.9 88.8 92.2 89.0
93.1 95.0 91.6 90.6 92.6 94.9 91.9

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The annex indicates the sources I used to measure GDP growth. It is intended to pro¬
vide some indication of the wealth of the present literature in this field, and of the
gaps that remain to be filled.
Australia: 1861-1901, GDP from N. G. Butlin, Australian Domestic Product, Invest¬
ment and Foreign Borrowing 1861-1938/39, Cambridge 1962, pp. 33-4. 1901-51,
GDP at 1966/67 prices from M. W, Butlin, A Preliminary Annual Database 1900/01
to 1973/74, Discussion Paper 7701, Reserve Bank of Australia, May 1977. All figures
adjusted to a calendar year basis.
Austria: 1830-1913 from A. Kausei, Österreichs Volkseinkommen 1830 bis 1913, in:
Geschichte und Ergebnisse der zentralen amtlichen Statistik in Österreich 1829-1979,
Beiträge zur österreichischen Statistik, Heft 550, 1979. 1913-50 gross national pro¬
duct from A. Kausei, N. Nemeth and H. Seidel, Österreichs Volkseinkommen, 1913-
63, in: Monatsberichte des Österreichischen Institutes für Wirtschaftsforschung, 14th
Sonderheft, Vienna, August 1965. 1937-45 from F. Butschek, Die Österreichische
Wirtschaft 1938 bis 1945, Stuttgart, 1979, p. 65. The figures are corrected for territo¬
rial change which has been large (in 1911-13 present day Austria represented only
37.4 per cent ofthe total output ofthe Austrian part ofthe Austro-Hungarian Empi¬
re). They refer to the product generated within the present boundaries of Austria.
Belgium: 1846-1913 gross domestic product derived from movements in agricultural
and industrial output from J. Gadisseur, Contribution ä l'Etude de la Production Agri-
cole en Belgique de 1846 ä 1913, in: Revue Beige d'Histoire Contemporaine, IV
(1973), 1-2, and service output which was assumed to move with employment in Ser¬
vices (derived for census years from P. Bairoch, La Population Active et sa Structure,
Brüssels 1968, pp. 87-88). 1913 weights derived from Carbonnelle. 1913-50 gross do¬
mestic product estimates derived from C. Carbonnelle, Recherches Sur TEvolution de
la Production en Belgique de 1900 ä 1957, in: Cahiers Economiques de Bruxelles, No.
3, April 1959, p. 353. Carbonnelle gives G.D.P. figures for only a few benchmark ye¬
ars but gives a commodity production series for many more years. Interpolations
were made for the service sector to arrive at a figure for G.D.P. for all the years for
which Carbonnelle shows total commodity production. Figures corrected to exclude
the effect of the cession by Germany of Eupen and Malmedy in 1925, which added
0.81 per cent to population and was assumed to have added the same proportion to
output.
Canada: Gross national product (expenditure) from O. J. Firestone, Canada's Eco¬
nomic Development 1867-1953, London 1958, p. 276 for 1867-1926; 1926 to 1950
from National Income and Expenditure Accounts 1926-1974, Vol. I, Statistics Canada,
1976. Figures adjusted to offset the acquisition of Newfoundland in 1949 which ad¬
ded 1.3 per cent to G.N.P. and 2.6 to population.
Denmark: 1820-1950 G.D.P. at factor cost (1929 prices) from S. A. Hansen, Okono-
misk vaekst i Danmark, Vol. II, Institute of Economic History, Copenhagen 1974, pp.
229-32 (figures from 1921 onwards adjusted to offset the acquisition of North Schles¬
wig, which added 5.3 per cent to the population, and 4.5 per cent to G.D.P.).
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Finland: 1860-1950 GDP from O. E. Niitamo, National Accounting and National
Statistical Service on the Threshold ofthe 1980's, in: Finnish Journal of Business Eco¬
nomics, I, (1980).
France: For the eighteenth Century J. Marczewski has presented rough estimates of
economic growth based partly on the work of his colleague J. C. Toutain, who
showed a 60 per cent increase in agricultural output between the first and eighth de¬
cade. Toutain's estimates have been criticised by M. Morineau, Les Faux-Semblants
d'un Demarrage Economique, Paris 1971 who rejects all evidence of French progress
rather in the style of a prosecution attorney. E. Le Roy Ladurie presents a more bal¬
anced criticism and also presents an alternative estimate to Toutain which I have
used. The sources to 1820 were therefore: 1701-10 to 1820 movement in industry and
1781-90 to 1820 movement in agriculture from J. Marczewski, Some Aspects of the
Economic Growth of France, 1660-1958, in: Economic Development and Cultural
Change, April 1961, p. 375; 1701-10 to 1781-90 agricultural output increase assumed
to be 32.5 per cent, the mid point of the ränge suggested by E. Le Roy Ladurie, Le
Territoire de VHistorien, Vol. I, Paris 1973, p. 279. 1701-10 to 1781-90 output in Ser¬
vices assumed to move parallel with population. 1781-90 to 1820 output in Services
from J. Marczewski, The Take-OffHypothesis and French Experience, in: W. W. Ros¬
tow (ed.), The Economics ofthe Take-Off into Sustained Growth, New York 1965, p.
136. 1820-96 gross domestic product derived from separate indicators of industrial,
agricultural, building, and service Output. Industrial production, agriculture and
building from M. Levy-Leboyer, La Croissance Economique en France au XIXe Siecle,
in: Annales, July-August 1968, p. 802 bis. Service Output interpolated from J. Marc¬
zewski, Take-Off, p. 136. 1896-1950 GDP and 1896 sector weights from J. J. Carre, P.
Dubois and E. Malinvaud, La Croissance Frangaise, Paris 1972, pp. 35 and 637. Inter¬
polation between 1913 and 1920 based on figures for industrial and agricultural Out¬
put shown in J. Dessirier, Indices Compares de la Production Industrielle et Production
Agricole en Divers Pays de 1870 a 1928, in: Bulletin de la Statistique Generale de la
France, Etudes Speciales, October-December 1928; service output was assumed sta¬
ble in this period, and weights for the three sectors were derived from Carre, Dubois
and Malinvaud, Croissance. Interpolation between 1939 and 1946 was based on A.
Sauvy's report on national income to the Conseil Economique, Journal Offtciel, 7th
April, 1954. (Sauvy's estimates for this period seem reasonable when checked against
estimates of wartime agricultural and industrial output. See M. Cepede, Agriculture et
Alimentation en France Durant la Ile Guerre Mondiale, Paris 1961 and Annuaire de
Statistique Industrielle 1938-1947, Ministere de TIndustrie et du Commerce, Paris,
1948.) The figures from 1918 onwards were adjusted downwards by 4.6 per cent to
offset the impact ofthe return of Alsace Lorraine, figures for 1861-70 multiplied by
95.92 to offset for inclusion of Alsace Lorraine, and 1860 and earlier by 97.65 to off¬
set both the impact of acquisition of Nice and Savoy in 1861 and the Alsace-Lorraine
component.
Germany: 1816-50 GDP estimated from Prussian data in R. H. Tilly, Capital Forma¬
tion in Germany in the Nineteenth Century, in: P. Mathias and M. M. Postan (eds.),
Cambridge Economic History of Europe, Vol. VII, Part I, pp. 395, 420 and 441. Us¬
ing 1850 weights for agriculture, industry and Services from Hoffmann, p. 454, Prus-
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sian per capita output in agriculture and industry were multiplied by population in
Germany as a whole. Output in Services was assumed to move with population.
1850-1925 net domestic product (value added by industry) at factor cost from W. G.
Hoffmann, F. Grumbach and H. Hesse, Das Wachstum der deutschen Wirtschaft seit
der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts, Berlin 1965, pp. 454-5. This source gives no figures
for 1914-24, but Starts again in 1925. The pattern of movement in individual years
1914-24 was derived from annual indices of industrial and agricultural output in
Dessirier, using Hoffmann's weights for these sectors and adjusting them to fit his
sectoral output benchmarks for 1913 and 1925. Service output was interpolated be¬
tween Hoffmann's 1913 and 1925 figures for this sector. 1925-39 GDP from Bevölke¬
rung und Wirtschaft 1872-1972, Statistical Office, Wiesbaden 1972, p. 250. 1939-44
GNP from E. F. Denison and W. C. Haraldson, The Gross National Product of Ger¬
many 1936-1944, Special Paper 1 (mimeographed), in: J. K. Galbraith (ed.), The Ef¬
fects of Strategie Bombing on the German War Economy, U.S. Strategie Bombing
Survey 1945. 1946 from Wirtschaftsproblemen der Besatzungszonen, Berlin 1948,
p. 135; 1945 was assumed to lie midway between 1944 and 1946. 1947-50 from Statis¬
tics of National Product and Expenditure No. 2, 1938 and 1947 to 1955, O.E.E.C,
Paris 1957, p. 63. The estimates are fully corrected for territorial change which
was extremely complicated in Germany. It can be summarised in simplified form
as follows (in terms of ratio of old to new territory 1870 96.15 per cent; 1918 108.39
per cent; 1946 155.35 per cent. (See A. Maddison, Phases of Capitalist Develop¬
ment, in: Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, June 1977, p. 133-4 for füll
detail.)
Italy: 1861-1950 gross domestic product at 1938 prices from P. Ercolani, Documen-
tazione statistica di base, in: G. Fua (ed.), La Sviluppo Economico in Italia, vol. III,
pp. 410-12, Milan 1975. The figures refer to Output in the present territory of Italy
("confini attuali", see p. 388). Figures in an earlier official study, Annali di Statistica,
Serie VIII, vol. 9, Instituto Centrale di Statistica, Rome 1957 show a gain in output
due to territorial change of 3.2 per cent after the first world war and a loss of 1.5 per
cent after the second world war (corresponding population changes were a gain of
4.1 per cent and a loss of 1.4 per cent respectively).
Japan: 1885-1930, gross domestic product at 1934-36 prices from K. Ohkawa, N.
Takamatsu and Y. Yamamoto, National Income, Vol. I of Estimates of Long-Term
Economic Statistics o Japan since 1868, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, Tokyo 1974, p. 227.
Rough estimate for 1870 was derived by assuming that per capita product rose by 1
per cent a year from 1870 to 1885. This is smaller than the later period, but 1870-85
saw major upheavals in which economic growth was probably slow. 1930-42, gross
national product at 1934-36 prices from National Income White Paper (in Japanese),
1963 edition, p. 178 adjusted (from 1946 to a calendar year basis. 1952 onwards from
National Accounts of OECD Countries 1950-78, Vol. I, pp. 28-9. In the above
sources, Okinawa is included up to 1945, and excluded from 1946 to 1972. An up¬
ward adjustment of 0.66 per cent was made for 1946 to offset the impact of territorial
change, and 1973 was adjusted down by 0.92 per cent of offset the impact of Okina-
wa's return.
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Netherlands: For 1700 it was assumed that Dutch GDP per head was a little more
than 50 per cent higher than that ofthe U.K. This rough assumption is based on com¬
parative evidence of economic structure and relative levels of international trade, in¬
vestment and government finance in the two countries as shown mainly in Jan de
Vries, The Dutch Rural Economy in the Golden Age, 1500-1700, Yale 1974, and P.
Deane and W. A. Cole, British Economic Growth 1688-1959, Cambridge 1964. In
1700 about two thirds ofthe U.K. labour force was in agriculture, and in the Nether¬
lands the proportion was about one third. I assume productivity was higher in indus¬
try and Services than in agriculture in both countries and the evidence suggests
strongly that Dutch productivity was higher in each sector. Dutch agriculture was
more specialised with a large internal trade carried by canal, exports of dairy prod¬
uets, a quarter of its grain was imported from Eastern Europe and cattle were im-
ported on a large scale from Denmark. Its industry was highly diversified with a
great deal of international trade, and the Dutch performing sophisticated finishing
processes (bleaching, printing, dyeing) for English woollens and German linens. Ac¬
tivity in international banking, insurance, shipping, warehousing was on a much
larger scale per capita than in the U.K. At the end of the seventeenth Century the
Dutch merchant fleet was about 50 per cent larger than the British but population
was a fifth ofthat in the U.K. (See R. Davis, The Rise ofthe English Shipping Indus-
triy, London 1962, p. 27 for the size of British fleets and W. Vogel, Zur Grösse der eu¬
ropäischen Handelsflotten im 15., 16. und 17. Jahrhundert, in: Festschrift D. Schäfer,
Forschungen und Versuche zur Geschichte des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit, Jena,
1915, p. 331, for Dutch shipping.) Gregory King estimated Dutch per capita income
as only 4 per cent higher than that of England in 1695 (see G. E. Barnett, Two Tracts
by Gregory King, Baltimore 1936, p. 55) but he overestimated Dutch population by
18 per cent. Assuming that this error was independent of his output estimate (which
is not clear) this would raise King's differential to about 23 per cent in favour ofthe
Netherlands as against England. Our own estimates for the U.K. (see below) imply
that U.K. per capita income in 1700 was about 4.5 per cent lower than that in Eng¬
land and Wales. Adjusting King again for this would produce a differential of 29 per
cent in favour ofthe Netherlands as against the U.K. However, King estimates Eng¬
lish consumption levels to be one third higher than the Netherlands (even after ad¬
justing for his population error). This seems implausible. Hence, the evidence of Gre¬
gory King, though it points to a lower Dutch advantage than I suggest is not too per-
suasive. (H. C. Bos, Economic Growth ofthe Netherlands, IARIW Portoroz 1959 (mi¬
meographed) presented a rough estimate of Dutch per capita income in 1688 com¬
pared with 1910 which is not different from my estimate, though the approach is
quite different.)
In the eighteenth Century the Dutch economy stagnated. The process is described
in detail without any aggregate quantification by Johan de Vries, De economische
Achteruitgang der Republiek in de Achttiende Eeuw, Leiden 1968. From 1700 to 1760 I
have assumed that Dutch per capita GDP feil by 10 per cent and then stagnated. Per
capita GNP probably did not decline because of the increase in foreign investment
and the receipts from it. These receipts, and GDP, were quite adversely affected dur¬
ing the Napoleonic wars and French occupation. I have not made any direct estimate
of 1820-70 growth, but this emerges as a by-produet from the above and from esti¬
mates backcast from 1970 to 1870 from the following sources. 1870-1900 GDP from
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S. Kuznets, Economic Growth of Nations, Harvard 1971, pp. 12 and 16. 1900-17,
1921-39, and 1948-50 net domestic product and 1917-20 national income at constant
market prices derived from 1899-1959 Zestig Jaren Statistiek in Tijdreeksen, Centraal
Bureau voor de Statistiek, Zeist 1959, p. 102. 1939-47 real product in international
units interpolated from C. Clark, Conditions of Economic Progress, 3rd ed., London
1957, p. 166-7.
Norway: Gross domestic product at market prices. 1865-1950 from National Ac¬
counts 1865-1960, Central Bureau of Statistics, Oslo 1965, pp. 348-59 (gross fixed in¬
vestment was adjusted downwards by a third to eliminate repairs and maintenance).
1939-44 movement in national income (exluding shipping and whaling Operations
carried out from Allied bases 1940-44) from O. Aukrust and P. J. Bjerve, Hva Krigen
Kostet Norge, Oslo 1945, p. 45. 1945 assumed to be midway between 1944 and 1946.
Sweden: 1861-1950 gross domestic-product from O. Krantz and C. A. Nilsson, Swe¬
dish National Product 1861-1970: New Aspects on Methods and Measurement, Kris-
tianstad 1975, p. 171.
Switzerland: 1890-1944 real product in international units from C. Clark, Conditions
ofEconomic Progress, 3rd edition, London 1957, pp. 188-9. The link 1938-48 is from
Europe and the World Economy, OEEC, Paris 1960. 1948-76 from Series Revisees de
la Comptabilite Nationale Suisse 1948-1970, Federal Statistical Office, Berne 1977,
pp. 26-7. The rough estimate for 1870 was derived by backward extrapolation ofthe
1890-1913 movement in output per head. There is a graphical indication of the
growth of Swiss real product in F. Kneschaurek, Probleme der langfristigen Markt¬
prognose, in: Aussenwirtschaft, December 1959, p. 336 for 1900-65. This shows faster
growth than C. Clark to 1938. U. Zwingli and E. Ducret, Das Sozialprodukt als Wert¬
messer des langfristigen Wirtschaftswachstums, in: Schweizerische Zeitschrift für
Volkswirtschaft und Statistik, March-June 1964, shows slower growth for 1910-38
than C. Clark.
U.K.: 1700-1800 England and Wales from P. Deane and W. A. Cole, British Eco¬
nomic Growth 1688-1959, Cambridge 1964, p. 78 (excluding government) and 1801-
1831 for Great Britain from p. 282. The Deane and Cole estimates were adjusted to a
U.K. basis, assuming Irish output per head in 1830 to be half ofthat in Great Britain
(as Deane herseif hypothesises in the source mentioned below) and to have been
stagnant from 1800-1830, assuming that Scottish and Irish output per head in 1800
were threequarters of that in England and Wales in 1800, and that output per head
increases by a quarter in these two areas from 1700 to 1800 (as compared with a
growth of 47 per cent in England and Wales). 1830-1855 gross national product at
factor cost from P. Deane, New Estimates of Gross National Product for the United
Kingdom 1830-1914, in: The Review of Income and Wealth, June 1968, p. 106,
linked to 1855-1950 gross domestic product at factor cost (compromise estimate)
from C. H. Feinstein, National Income Expenditure and Output ofthe United Kingdom
1855-1965, Cambridge 1972, pp. T 18-20. Figures from 1920 onwards are increased
by 3.8 per cent to offset the exclusion of output in the area which became the Irish
Republic.
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U.S.A.: G.D.P., 1820-40 at 1840 prices derived from P. A. David, The Growth ofReal
Product in the United States before 1840: New Evidence, Controlled Conjectures, in:
Journal of Economic History, June 1967. The method assumes that 1820-40 agricul¬
tural output moved parallel with total population, derives the agricultural productiv¬
ity movement from this and further assumes that agricultural and non-agricultural
productivity grew at the same pace. Agricultural productivity in 1840 is taken as 51
per cent of non-agricultural. 1840-1889 movement of G.N.P. in 1860 prices (The
movement in our estimates for the U.S.A. between 1840 and 1889 is very similar to
those of T. S. Berry, Revised Annual Estimates ofAmerican Gross National Product:
Preliminary Annual Estimates of Four Major Components of Demand, Virginia 1978,
which is not surprising as they are both benchmarked on Gallman. Before 1840 Ber-
ry's estimates show even faster growth than David's.) derived from R. E. Gallman,
Gross National Product in the United States 1834-1909, in: Output, Employment and
Productivity in the United States after 1800, N.B.E.R., New York 1966, p. 26. Gall¬
man does not actually give figures for 1840, 1850, 1860, 1870 and 1889. These were
extrapolated from neighbouring years. The movement in individual years 1870-1889
was derived by using the index of output in mining manufacturing and construction
in W. A. Lewis, Growth and Fluctuations 1870-1913, London 1978, p. 273, the index
of farm production from F. Strauss and L. H. Bean, Gross Farm Income and Indices
ofFarm Production and Prices in the United States 1869-1937, Technical Bulletin 703,
U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Washington 1940, p. 126, table 61 (Laspeyre's index), and
interpolating the movement in Services from the residual derived from Gallman. 1889
weights (agriculture 28.1, industry 26.7, other 45.2 per cent) at 1929 prices were de¬
rived from The National Income and Product Accounts of the United States, 1929-
1974, p. 186, and the 1889-1929 product movement by sector as shown in Kendrick,
pp. 302-3 as cited below. 1889-1929, gross domestic product from J. W. Kendrick,
Productivity Trends in the United States, National Bureau of Economic Research,
Princeton 1961, p. 298-9. 1929-79 GDP from The National Income and Product Ac¬
counts ofthe United States: An introduction to the Revised Estimates for 1929-80, in:
Survey of Current Business, December 1980, Figures corrected to exclude the impact
of the accession of Alaska and Hawaii in 1960. These two states added 0.5 per cent to
total product, but part was already included and the explicit addition was only 0.2
per cent, see Survey of Current Business, July 1962, p. 5.
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